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It is well known that, unless worker-firm match quality is controlled for, returns to firm tenure
(RTT) estimated directly via reduced form wage (Mincer) equations will be biased. In this paper
we show that even if match quality is properly controlled for there is a further pervasive source of
bias, namely the co-movement of firm employment and firm wages. In a simple mechanical model
where human capital is absent and separation is exogenous we show that positively covarying
shocks (either aggregate or firm level) to firm’s employment and wages cause downward bias in
OLS regression estimates of RTT. We show that the long established procedures for dealing with
"traditional" RTT bias do not circumvent the additional problem we have identified. We argue
that if a reduced form estimation of RTT is undertaken, firm-year fixed effects must be added in
order to eliminate this bias. Estimates from two large panel datasets from Portugal and Germany
show that the bias is empirically important. Adding firm-year fixed effects to the regression
increases estimates of RTT in the two respective countries by between 3.5% and 4.5% of wages at
20 years of tenure – over 80% (50%) of the estimated RTT level itself. The results extend to
tenure correlates used in macroeconomics such as the minimum unemployment rate since joining
the firm. Adding firm-year fixed effects changes estimates of these effects also.
∗This work was partly supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number
ES/L009633/1] and the German Science Foundation (SPP 1764).
1 Introduction and Overview
A rigorous understanding of returns to firm tenure - typically regarded as a measure of firm-
specific human capital - is important for a host of reasons. In particular it can shed light
on the impact of training or on the job learning on labour productivity. Alternatively, it
may inform our understanding of the importance of bargaining and rent sharing in firms.
The magnitude of returns to tenure can also determine the importance of the internal labour
market compared to its external counterpart. Finally, returns to tenure have important
implications in terms of wage inequality, the costs of unemployment and the debate on
labour-market segmentation.
Traditionally labour economists use coeffi cient estimates on deterministic tenure in a
Mincer equation as a measure of returns to tenure (henceforth RTT). This approach - which
we refer to as a reduced form approach - is easy to implement and avoids making structural
economic assumptions about worker entry and exit from the firm. However and as is now
well known, the existence of unobservable worker-firm-match quality means that the OLS
regression of wages on tenure gives upward biased estimates of RTT. Several methods – most
notably the two step estimator of Topel (1991) and the IV approach of Altonji and Shaktoko
(1987) – have been used to circumvent this problem (for a very recent example of an
application of both of these methods see Devereux et al., 2013). More recently the emergence
of very large panel datasets and advances in computing power have allowed investigators to
absorb unobserved worker and match quality by adding firm-worker match fixed effects (see
for example Battisti, 2012).
In this paper we identify a new and potentially pervasive source of bias, namely the
existence of a time varying firm wage component that co-moves with firm employment. We
show that even in a world where match quality is irrelevant, if positive firm wage/employment
co-movements exist, the failure to account for them will bias estimates of returns to tenure
downwards. The mechanism generating the bias is the following; firms that have a relatively
high (low) wage at time t (i.e., relative to average wages at that firm) will have a relatively
high (low) employment at t, hence high (low) hiring at t and hence relatively low (high)
average firm tenure at t. Tenure is then spuriously negatively correlated with wages. We
show that traditional estimators – ones designed to eliminate the effects of unobservable
worker/firm match quality – are not immune to the bias arising from this effect.
Drivers of a firm’s wage/employment co-movements may include both aggregate (business
cycle) shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. In both cases the shocks that are the root cause of the
problem are assumed to impact all workers in the firm, i.e., they are common components
of wages. Because these components are the same for each worker in a firm we propose
that if a reduced form method is undertaken then the components should be removed via
the addition of firm-year interaction fixed effects to panel wage regressions. At the same
time one must add match fixed effects to control for the more traditional match quality
problem. In an empirical application we use large matched panel datasets from Germany
and Portugal to show that the bias is empirically important – adding firm-year fixed effects
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(henceforth FYFE) to wage equations (whilst controlling for worker-firm match quality)
increases estimated tenure effects in the two countries by around 1.5% and 4% of wages,
respectively, at 10 years of tenure, and 3.5% and 4.5% of wages at 20 years of tenure. As a
proportion of RTT itself these biases exceed 80% for Portugal at ten years of tenure. For
Germany the corresponding number is just below 20% rising to 50% at 20 years of tenure.
An interesting aspect of our findings is that the bias is driven by idiosyncratic firm level
wage/employment co-movement and not aggregate co-movement. An implication of this is
that simple fixes such as controlling for the aggregate cycle via the addition of year fixed
effects and/or controlling for the level of firm employment (with a single coeffi cient) will not
work. Although investigators may have been aware of some facets of the problem we have
highlighted (see for example a discussion in Topel, 1991, on high wage/employment growth
firms or the discussion in Buhai, et al., 2014 on the "size" effect and tenure), to the best of
our knowledge we are the first to formally analyse it, quantify its importance and propose a
simple solution.
A further implication of our results is that using variables that interact macroeconomic
variables such as unemployment with deterministic tenure will also result in biased inference.
Canonical examples of such variables are Beaudry and DiNardo’s (1991) minimum unem-
ployment rate during a worker’s tenure ("minu") and a new hire dummy interacted with
unemployment to measure the incremental cyclicality of new hire wages.1 In an extension
to the empirics we quantify these biases as well. The empirical importance of these variates
found in the literature adds a further twist because their omission will be yet another source
of bias to RTT estimates. We do not model the impact on RTT of omitting these variates
theoretically. Instead we quantify the impact in our empirical section.
The key result in this paper — that there is another source of pervasive bias to RTT
estimates obtained via reduced form estimation —may lead the investigator to conclude that
the safest way to proceed is via a fully specified structural model of worker mobility (see
Buchinsky. et al., 2010, for a recent example of such a model). However one key finding of our
work is that it is firm specific (heterogeneous) co-movement that drives the biases we find and
not macro (aggregate) effects. A structural model with heterogeneous firm wage/hiring co-
movements may be hard to specify and identify empirically. Additionally, estimates obtained
from structural models are only as good as the veracity of their underlying assumptions. As
far as reduced form modeling goes, our paper has a clear message. To avoid substantial RTT
bias one must not only control for worker—firm match quality (as per tradition) but also for
FYFE.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 revisits the traditional econometric model
of RTT and the implications for wages. We outline the two canonical estimation methods
1Of course if wages are solely determined by a Beaudry Di Nardo style mechanism where an individual
worker’s wage is independent of firm hiring, then the positive comovements of wages and employment driving
our bias will not exist. But there is strong empirical evidence that wage mechanisms vary across firms and
sectors. We view the coexistence of e.g. minu effects with equal treatment wage components in a panel as
reflecting this heterogeneity and coeffi cient estimates on minu as representing an average effect across the
sample.
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of Topel (1991) and Altonji and Shakotko (1987) devised to deal with unobserved worker
firm match quality. We then show in section 3 that, in a simple mechanical model with
exogenous separation and no human capital (match or firm specific), positive co-movement
of firm wages and employment leads to downwards bias in the RTT estimates whatever
method is used. Section 4 contains the empirical results whilst section 5 summarises and
concludes.
2 Bias in Estimating Returns to Tenure Arising from
Match Quality
We start with a traditional – and somewhat simplified2 – archetypal model of RTT. We
assume that log wages wijt for worker i in firm j at time t are given by
wijt = α + βτijt + γEit + δ
′
Xijt + εijt (Model A)
where εijt = φi + θij + uijt (Error A)
where τijt is the worker’s tenure, Eit is her lifetime work experience and X is a vector of
other controls. The error consists of a worker fixed effect φi, job match quality θij and an
idiosyncratic error uncorrelated with the regressors. Model A makes clear what we mean by
RTT. It is the incremental wage received within the firm by all incumbent workers for each
year of completed tenure.3 The definition may be loosened to allow heterogenous (across
firms) tenure related wage growth. In this case the estimates could interpreted as average
RTT across firms with weights given by firm employment within the sample - analagous to
average treatment effects in the experimental literature.
The problem arises when the job match quality θij is correlated with worker i′s tenure.
When the match is good (high θij) the worker’s separation hazard may fall (see in particular
Bowlus, 1995) and expected tenure will rise. This biases upwards the RTT estimate β. As
noted above one solution to this problem is to explicitly model the entry and exit decisions of
workers via a fully specified structural economic model. Following on our previous discussion,
here we only consider reduced form estimation. In this context the most popular empirical
solutions to the problem of endogenous match quality are the methods of Topel (1991) and
Altonji and Shakotko (1987).
Topel’s method first differences incumbents’wages to remove the (presumed constant)
match quality and worker fixed effect. Regressing these incumbent wage changes on an
2In particular more general specifications – as in our empirical section – would include a polynomial in
tenure whereas for expositional clarity we have a single linear term.
3As we have noted already if there are also differential (across tenure) macro effects on wages these must be
controlled for as well. The cases we explore later in the paper are differential new hire wages as modelled via
inclusion of a new hire dummy interacted with the unemployment rate and the impact of implicit contracts
as modeled via inclusion of minu.
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intercept and on ∆Xijt would – in this model at least – produce a consistent estimate of
β + γ, β̂ + γ say. In order to separately identify β and γ, Topel (1991) proposed estimating
a second stage regression of wijt − β̂ + γτijt on Xijt and the worker’s initial experience on
entry to the firm. Provided the latter is not correlated with job match quality this produces
a consistent estimate of γ. Subtracting the latter estimate from β̂ + γ gives a consistent
estimate of the RTT parameter β.
Altonji and Shakotko’s (1987) solution to the problem involved using deviations of a
worker’s tenure from her ex post time at the firm as an instrument for tenure itself. Such a
variable is by definition uncorrelated with both the time invariant job match quality θij and
the worker fixed effect φi.4
We now show that the above two methods fail when firm wages and employment co-
move through time. We abstract from complications such as human capital and endogenous
worker separation to make clear that the biases we identify exist even in the absence of such
effects. The quantitative significance of the bias is an empirical issue which we deal with in
a separate section below.
3 Bias Arising from Comovement of Firm Wages and
Employment
We now consider a model that abstracts from the existence of human capital in Model A but
that focuses instead on the possible effects of within firm wage/employment co-movements:
wijt = α + βτijt +$jt (1)
with i = 1, . . . , Ljt; j = 1, . . . , n; t = 1, . . . , T ;
E(Ljt−k$jt) = σjk, (2)
Lτjt = s
τ (Ljt−τ − sLjt−τ−1), (3)
Assumption: Lτjt > 0. (4)
Equation (1) expresses log wage in terms of worker tenure τ
ijt
, exogenous survival rate s
(equal to one minus the separation rate) and a firm specific shock$jt. Ljt is firm employment
at time t.
To fix ideas, and in keeping with much of the relevant data in the area, we consider t to be
years. The $jt are "equal treatment" components of wages because all workers within firm j
receive them (see Snell and Thomas, 2010, Hall, 2005, Gertler and Trigari, 2009, Michaillat,
2012 and Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari, 2014 for examples of macro theories based on equal
treatment and see the latter for empirical evidence in support of it).
4In any panel data set the worker fixed effect is subsumed in the job match fixed effect – it is not
separately identified.
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Equation (2) implies that the wage shock $jt may be correlated with current firm em-
ployment – this is the firm specific wage/employment co-movement we spoke of above. The
equation also allows the wage shock to be correlated with previous employment levels in
cases where σjk 6= 0. It also allows for the possibility of an aggregate business cycle in wages
and employment. In (3) we specify a constant and exogenous survival (separation) rate s
(1− s), where Lτjt is the number of workers at time t with tenure τ, and assume in (4) that
separations are never so low or negative employment shocks so large that there is no net
new hiring. This (linearity) assumption is made for tractability purposes; if we consider the
frequency of observation to be annual then it is not an unreasonable one.5
To simplify we set β = 0 (see Model A) so that there is no firm specific human capital
embedded in the model and nor is there a return to experience or heterogeneous match
quality. This is for clarity; we wish to focus on biases away from zero of the RTT coeffi cient
arising because of firm wage/employment co-movements. We discuss the implications for
estimates of returns to experience later. We set τ = 0 for "new hires" (workers with less
than one year of tenure).
The model abstracts from idiosyncratic shocks and firm specific intercepts and common
deterministic trends in wages. Adding idiosyncratic (worker specific) shocks to wages would
not change our results as long as the number of workers in each firm is large. With regards to
common deterministic trends these are typically removed in empirical work via the addition
of (common) time trends whilst firm fixed effects are typically used to extract firm specific
intercepts. We would not wish our results to be driven by the existence of these components
and so do not model them.
As noted above we assume that the number of workers per firm per year is large. We
need this in order to obtain consistent estimates of firm specific wage components at time
t. Given a fixed number of firms this amounts to assuming N/T is large where N is the
total number of panel observations. We wish to derive results in terms of the time series
moments of firm wages and firm employment. A convenient assumption here would be to
assume T itself is large (with T/N → 0). Although this assumption is counterfactual –
panel time spans are typically modest – we do not think it is critical. We could easily drop
the large T assumption and couch our results in terms of sample time series moments rather
than theoretical ones. The sign of the bias would then depend on the sign of the sample
moments instead of their theoretical counterparts. As it is more common in contexts such as
these to derive results based on theoretical moments we prefer to use a large T assumption.
Henceforth we take probability limits as N, T → ∞ and T/N → 0. We assume we have a
panel consisting of all the workers working in n randomly selected firms during years 1 to T .
Casual inspection of the model shows that even in a world free of any kind of human
capital, tenure is endogenous; if σjk > 0 a firm which has above average wages at time t will
also have above average hiring and below average tenure at t.
5In the US annual average separation rates are typically in the region of 30%—40% although in Germany
and Portugal they are just above 10%..
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Ljt is the number of observations, τ is average tenure in the sample and svar
denotes sample variance. The denominator in (5) is obviously positive. Denoting average
firm employment per year as L
f
= N/nT and recalling that there are Lτjt workers of tenure
τ in firm j at time t with m being the total number of tenure categories7, we can rewrite the












Henceforth we normalise L
f
to unity – effectively normalising all of the firm employment















































Note that the first term in (6) does not contain the contemporaneous covariance between
firm wages and firm employment whilst the second term depends only on this covariance.
Note also that the second term (the contemporaneous wage/employment covariance term) is
multiplied by plim{τ}– typically well in excess of unity – whereas the first term’s summed
elements are scaled by sτ – which are strictly less than unity. This gives analytical force to
the claims made earlier that contemporaneous wage/employment co-movements are of first
order importance for the bias and that when these co-movements are positive the bias will
be negative.
We examine the bias in β yielded by OLS and the two step/IV methods outlined above
6Unless otherwise specified proofs of analytical results are given in the appendix.
7We assume all workers with tenure m years retire in the following period.
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for the simple case where non contemporaneous wage/employment covariances are zero, i.e.,
where σjk = 0 for k > 0. This is not to say we believe this assumption to be true. In fact,
adjustment costs and/or other frictions would imply that lagged co-movements would also
be correlated with wages. But as (6) shows the first order effect on the bias is driven by
contemporaneous wage/employment co-movements. We return to the case where wages are
correlated with lagged employment in section 4.4 below. There we try and calibrate the bias
and for that exercise it will be necessary to additionally control for lagged employment. The
analytical results on bias in this section focus only on first order effects so that the impact
of lagged employment may be ignored.










Equation (7) confirms our intuition that positive co-movement between firm wages and
employment would lead to negative bias in the RTT coeffi cient estimate β. However it also
shows that the co-movements need not be uniformly positive across firms for downward bias
to exist as long as the average is positive. This is important. It may be that for some firms,
shocks to their labour supply are the dominant influence on their wages rather than from
labour demand. This effect might be particularly salient in large firms that have a degree of
monopsony power in their hiring markets.
Now we assess the bias under the Topel (1991) method again taking β (RTT) and σ0 > 0
with σk = 0 for k > 0. For the first stage we drop new hire (tenure 0) observations and
regress first differenced wages on an intercept.8 In this case we show in the annex that
plim{β̂ + γ} = −{σ0
k
}s < 0 (8)
where k is the proportion of incumbents in the full sample. In the second stage we regress
wijt− β̂ + γτijt on worker i′s experience on joining the firm. As β̂ + γ is (negatively) biased
the error term becomes $jt+{β̂ + γ−β−γ)τijt. Under the assumption that a worker’s entry
experience is uncorrelated with his tenure, second stage OLS will give a consistent estimate
(of zero) in our setup. The RTT – the difference between first and second stage estimates
– will be β̂ + γ which as (8) shows is negative.
Turning to Altonji and Shakotko’s (1987) IV method we show that τijt − τ ij – where
τ ij is average tenure for worker i during his time at firm j – is an invalid instrument under
8Usually the RTT are modelled as an nth order polynomial function in tenure. In that case we would
regress on an intercept plus an n− 1th order polynomial.
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(τijt − τ ij)$jt = −σ0τ(s) (9)
where τ(s) is expected tenure of a new hire – determined by the fixed exogenous survival
rate s. Not only is the instrument invalid but in this simple single regressor single instrument
model – the RTT estimate it produces is downward biased.
3.1 Solution to the Problem: Firm-Year Fixed Effects
The source of the bias identified above is the common firm employment and firm wage error
components.
We propose a general procedure to handle this: estimate Model A but add firm-year
interaction fixed effects. To additionally control for match quality we must also include
firm-worker job match dummies – in effect a two way fixed effects procedure.
However adding match fixed effects in Model A means a loss of identification of the linear
experience term γ. Here we suggest following Topel. Experience should be dropped from
the equation and the coeffi cient on the linear tenure term should be used as a consistent
estimate of linear experience plus linear tenure, β + γ (β̃ + γ say). To separate the linear
tenure and experience effects run a second stage regression of wijt− β̃ + γτijt on the worker’s
experience on entry to the firm. Under the assumption that match effects are uncorrelated
with initial experience, this would yield a consistent estimate of γ. Subtracting the latter
from β̃ + γ would give a consistent estimate of β – the pure RTT term in Model A. An
alternative simpler method – one we pursue below in the empirical section – is to regress
the fitted worker-firm match fixed effects on experience on entry to the firm. This gives an
estimate of the linear experience term γ which when subtracted off the (linear) tenure term
in the two way fixed effects regression gives an estimate of RTT. Additionally this method
allows us to test the hypothesis that different firms attract workers of different experience.
To do this add firm fixed effects to the regression of fitted match on experience and see if it
significantly changes the estimate of γ; if it does not then we would conclude that firms are
homogeneous in terms of the experience of their workers.
3.2 Discussion
First of all we state the obvious. If one is purely interested in effects that vary only with
year and tenure then firm-year effects are uninformative and removing them seems a sensible
9We assume for simplicity that there are no partial firm spells in the data. We could not compute the
spell average tenure otherwise.
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thing to do. Once worker-firm match quality is controlled for (via match fixed effects) only
the cross tenure/year movements in wages are relevant to estimating RTT; components of
wages that are common to workers in firm j in year t cannot add information.
The second observation is that the use of correlates of tenure in business cycle studies is
also subject to the biases we have identified here. Two canonical examples spring to mind.
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) have a contracting model in which the minimum unemployment
rate since the worker joined the firm ("minu") is a suffi cient statistic for wages (modulo
human capital). Another example comes from the literature that evaluates a new-hire versus
incumbent wage premium; if the new hire wage is (again modulo human capital) found to
lie below the incumbent wage in recessions then this has profound implications for models
of the labour market because it implies that new hires are able to price themselves into
jobs during bad times. New hire/incumbent premia are typically evaluated via the inclusion
of a new hire dummy interacted with the unemployment rate ("δ0u" say) to an otherwise
standard Mincer equation. Both minu and δ0u are correlates of deterministic tenure and
suffer from the same problem as the tenure variable itself; coeffi cient estimates will be biased
if the workers in a firm suffer common wage shocks that covary with firm employment. It
would be particularly interesting if the bias on these terms could be shown to be negative
(leading to spurious "right signed" significance) but we cannot show this. In fact, intuitively
the opposite may appear true; high firm wages may be associated contemporaneously with
high firm employment, low (within firm) average tenure and high (within firm) averageminu
and δ0u leading to positive bias (bias towards zero). But when one also has to control for
tenure (as surely one must) the sign of the bias cannot be determined.10 We leave the sign
of the bias as an empirical issue – an issue which we flesh out in section 4 below.
Thirdly and following on from the previous discussion if variates such as minu and δ0u
are important determinants of wages their exclusion will be yet another source of bias to
RTT estimates. The omission of relevant regressors that are correlated with included ones
will always cause bias so this point is hardly new. Nonetheless for the sake of completeness
we assess the quantitative significance of the omission of these two key macro variates on
RTT in an extension to the empirics below.
Fourthly our FYFE correction allows for the possibility that firms may have heteroge-
neous wage and employment co-trends. The model in (1) to (4) could easily extend to capture
this type of firm heterogeneity and the end result would be the same – fast (slow) grow-
ing and high (low) wage growth firms would have lower (higher) average tenure and higher
(lower) average wages. This type of issue has been discussed before in the RTT literature
but as far as we know it has not been analysed.
Finally since the problem is co-movement of wages and employment at the firm level it
would be tempting to simply add firm employment to the panel regression to purge wages
10Simulations of our simple model – available on request – show that when tenure must be additionally
controlled for negative biases in minu and δ0u are possible under plausible firm wage/comovements. But as
we note in the text they are certainly not generic.
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of this variable. It is easy to show that this would only remove the bias if all firms dis-
played the same wage/employment co-movement. Furthermore it may also be the case that
wages are correlated with past firm employment levels as well which would require lagged
employment levels to be included. We shall see below in the empirical section that contem-
poraneous wage/employment co-movements are in fact very heterogeneous in our German
and Portuguese samples.
4 An Empirical Application to German and Portuguese
Panel Data
4.1 Method
In this section we apply our proposed bias correction method – the addition of firm-year
fixed effects – to the RTT estimates from subsamples drawn from two well-used panel data
sets; the QP from Portugal and the BeH from Germany. We estimate the following models
which allow RTT to be determined as a quartic function of tenure11:
wijt = θij + δ1t+ δ2t




























where ekit are regression errors
The first equation (10) controls for worker-firm (job match) fixed effects θij and a (quadratic)
time trend (t and t2). The second (11) replaces the quadratic trend with more general
year fixed effects φt. Specifications (10) and (11) are commonly used specifications in the
literature. The third specification (12) employs firm-year fixed effects ψjt – our proposed
solution to the bias.
The firm-year fixed effects in (12) will remove i) aggregate (business cycle) time effects
in wages ii) firm and/or sectoral level time effects in wages ii) common trends (stochastic or
deterministic) in wages and iv) firm specific wage trends. The square of age (Age2) proxies
for the square of experience. Note that the effects of linear experience are absorbed into
the linear tenure term β1 but this is not an issue for us: We are interested in the change in
the β’s when we add FYFE and if as argued above linear experience is not correlated with
11RTT are frequently modelled using a quartic in the literature and we have followed this tradition here.
Adding higher order terms – which were less statistically important – did not change the qualitative nature
of our results.
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either match effects or common wage components then these differences should only reflect
the bias in the RTT estimate.12
4.2 Data
We draw subsamples from the QP and BeH. For Germany we select all worker spells (see
below) in the 100 largest firms (largest by average employment per year) that existed through-
out the entire 1986—2009 time period. For Portugal – where firms are smaller – we selected
all firms that survived this period and that had a minimum of 100 employees each per year.
This gave us 127 firms. These choices were conditioned by our desire to get a large number
of data points each year in each firm in order to obtain accurate estimates of the firm year
fixed effects. Of course large long-lived firms may have several RTT characteristics that
make them unrepresentative of firms in the economy as a whole. However we are interested
in the difference between RTT estimates from various specifications rather than the absolute
level. We might also argue that as most workers in the economy work in large firms results
from a sample of large firms are more "representative" of an economy than would be the
results obtained from a random sample of firms.
We give a brief overview of these two well-used population-based matched employer-
employee panel data sets as well as the "cleaning" operations we perform on them.
General features of the data:
The BeH data set is organised by worker spells. A spell is a portion of a year spent at
a single firm. For the BeH if a worker stays with one firm throughout the year the average
daily wage for that "spell" forms a single datapoint. If the worker moves to a second firm
within the year there will be two spells that year; the average wage at each firm would form
a separate datapoint for that year. By contrast the QP is an annual survey that records
data on each worker at only one month in the year (March before 1994 but October from
1994 onwards). For QP then there is only one worker "spell" per year.
The BeH draws data from the total gainfully employed members of the German popu-
lation who are covered by the social security system. Not covered are self-employed, family
workers assisting in the operation of a family business, civil servants (Beamte) and regular
students. We focus solely on workers employed in states of the former West Germany. The
BeH covers roughly 80% of the German workforce. Plausibility checks performed by the
social security institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting guarantee
that the earnings data are very reliable – in contrast with interview based wage data such
12Buhai et al. (2014) argue that the (log of the) normalised worker tenure rank is an important determi-
nant of wages when added to traditional tenure specifications. Although significant, the effect they find is
quantitatively small (moving from being the "newest" to the "oldest" worker adds about 2% to the wage).
Adding this term would likely decrease our estimates of the level of RTT. However because such a vari-
ate is orthogonal to $jjt (the common firm wage component), the bias in RTT- which is the focus of our
paper-would be unaffected.
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as that in, say, the PSID (for the US) or the SOEP (for Germany).
Unfortunately the BeH only documents total spell earnings and not hours worked in that
spell. We therefore only consider full time workers. Nearly all full time workers in Germany
work a standard number of hours per week so the average daily wage should be very closely
related to the hourly wage. To calculate the daily real wage (in 2005 prices) we use the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Unfortunately wages are censored at a maximum level equal
to the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme. Earnings
spells with wages above or close to (within 1% of) the truncation point are dropped. We
drop all spells that have missing tenure. Unfortunately this means a worker only enters the
data when he joins a firm after Jan. 1, 1975.13 For this reason we drop the first 12 years
and use worker spells dated at 1986 and beyond.
The QP covers all workers except the self-employed and those employed in the public
sector; of course, the unemployed and the inactive are also not included. There are several
wage variables, all of them expressed in monthly values (the most common type of pay in
Portugal), including base wages, tenure-related payments, overtime pay, subsidies and ‘other
payments’(this latter category includes bonuses and profit- or performance-related pay). All
QP wages have been deflated using Portugal’s CPI and are expressed in 2005 euros. There
is also information about normal hours and overtime hours per month. The benchmark
measure of pay adopted in this study is based on the sum of all five types of pay divided by
the sum of the two types of hours worked, resulting in a measure of total hourly pay. Tenure
is measured (in rounded years) as the current year minus the reported start year.
The Table below gives a brief summary of the datasets’main features. Averages and
standard deviations are taken over job spells.
Table 1: Data Summary Statistics
Portugal Germany
Average log monthly wage (2005 Euros) 7.01 7.93
s.d. log monthly wage .637 .286
s.d. log(Lj) .882 .634
Average Tenure (Years) 12.9 9.2
s.d. Tenure 10.2 7.3
Number of Workers Per Firm Per Year 1489 6112
Number of Years Available (1986—2009)14 22 24
Number of Tenure Categories Available 51 36
Note: Lj is average annual employment of firm j.
13For the analysis we only use the years 1986—2009, but for the identification of firm entrants and the
calculation of firm-tenure we use BeH data from 1975 onwards. However, we exclude all spells starting Jan.
1, 1975 because the tenure could be left censored. For Portugal there no data exists for the years 1990 and
2001.
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Table 1 shows some stark differences in the two labour markets. Aside from average
wages being very much lower in Portugal (as we would expect) wages are over twice as
volatile there. Average tenure however is very high in both countries. Separation rates are
around 10%, much lower than the 30% level in the US (see for example Hobijn and Sahin,
2007). Firms are not only very much smaller in Portugal but also vary in size more than
they do in Germany. We will return to some of these differential features below.
4.3 Estimates
In this section we estimate a variety of wage on tenure specifications and extract fitted values
of the (quartic in) tenure component. As noted already these fitted values incorporate the
effects of linear experience. For clarity and correctness we refer to these fitted values as
"RTTE" – "returns to tenure plus linear experience".
The number of yearly tenure categories available from BeH and QP were 51 and 36
respectively. We start by estimating the "Base" specification (10) and comparing with
the specification where we add firm year fixed effects (henceforth the FYFE specification)
equation (12) above. Table 2 below displays the results for the four tenure terms
Table 2: Estimates of Tenure Effects for Germany and Portugal
Portugal
β̂1 β̂2 β̂3 β̂4
Base: Equation (10) 1.720 −1.207 .256 −.026
(.133) (.132) (.048) (.006)
Year FE: Equation (11) 1.780 −1.203 .270 −.023
(.117) (.116) (.043) (.005)
FYFE: Equation (12) 2.470 −1.570 .343 −.027
(.146) (.133) (.045) (.005)
Germany
β̂1 β̂2 β̂3 β̂4
Base: Equation 10) 5.585 −3.896 1.576 −.221
(.103) (.111) (.055) (.087)
Year FE: Equation (11) 5.611 −3.856 1.553 −.217
(.100) (.108) (.054) (.009)
FYFE: Equation (12) 5.691 −3.786 1.522 −.212
(.076) (.099) (.048) (.008)
Note: Standard errors, clustered by tenure, are in parentheses. β̂k and standard errors are
scaled by 10k+1.
We see that adding Year FE changes the results only marginally in all cases. By con-
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trast adding FYFE to Base causes quantitatively important changes in many of the tenure
estimates. This is particularly true for Portugal; here the first three tenure terms are about
25% higher in absolute value in the FYFE compared with Base and the 95% confidence
intervals for the FYFE linear and quadratic terms do not include their Base counterparts.
The German estimates change far less and the Base and FYFE confidence intervals for each
parameter overlap.
However, changes in the individual parameter estimates per se tell us little directly about
changes in the RTTE. To get a better handle on the impact of adding FYFE to overall RTTE
estimates we plot the implied difference in RTTE estimates (FYFE minus Base) against
tenure (in years). Henceforth we refer to these differences as the "bias" (although this is
somewhat erroneous as it is in fact the negative of the bias15).
We do not have exact standard errors for the bias but we can obtain an upper bound
for them as follows. We show in the annex that under the null hypothesis of no bias the
covariance matrix of the Base RTTE estimates exceeds that of the bias by a positive definite
matrix. The variance of the bias will in this case have an upper bound equal to the variance
of Base RTTE estimates. Given that the RTT estimates at each tenure level are merely linear
combinations of the tenure parameters we can use the Base covariance matrix to construct
90% and 95% upper bound confidence intervals around the bias. Figures 1 and 2 display
the differences in RTTE estimates (FYFE minus Base) together with their 90% and 95%
upper bound confidence intervals for Portugal and Germany respectively. Figures 3 and 4
plot graphs for FYFE minus Year FE again with upper bounds 90% and 95% confidence
intervals16.
The bias is positive and rises with tenure in both countries. At a tenure of 10 years
the bias rises to about 4.0% of wages in Portugal and 1.7% in Germany. At 2017 years of
tenure the German bias rises to above 3.5% In terms of statistical importance, the bias is
highly significant at the 95% level for Portugal but has borderline significance for Germany.
However the German bias is significant at the 90% level. Given that the confidence intervals
are upper bounds and that our prior view was that Base RTTE estimates would be downward
biased (motivating a one tailed test and use of the 90% level) we could justifiably argue that
the bias is significant for both countries.
Recall that our linear tenure terms also included the effects of linear experience. To get
estimates of the level of RTT itself, "pure" RTT, we first of all need to get an estimate of the
effect of linear experience. To do this we follow the second suggestion advanced in section
3.1: Regress fitted match effects on experience at the time of entry to the firm. Doing so
gives linear experience estimates of just above 0.7% per year in Portugal and 2.2% per year in
15It is also erroneous in that it implies that there are no other sources of bias. Our claim here is to have
identified a major and pervasive source of bias to RTT rather than an exclusive source.
16The variance result we derive in the annex for the FYFE minus Base case is easily adapted to the FYFE
minus Year FE case. We do not offer a proof but one is available on request.
17We do not analyse results beyond 20 years of tenure. The numbers of workers in tenure categories above
20 years and hence the precision of our estimates is low and falls sharply with tenure.
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Germany. Subtracting these experience estimates from the tenure estimates obtained from
(12) gives us our "pure" RTT estimate. For workers of ten years tenure the pure RTT is just
over 5% for Portugal and about 9% for Germany. These estimates show how quantitatively
important the biases are; for Portugal (and again for workers of ten years of tenure) the bias
is over 80% of its pure RTT counterpart whilst for Germany it is about 20% rising to 50%
at very long (20 years) tenure.
Finally and as an aside we note a feature of the estimation of the linear experience term.
We found that adding firm fixed effects to the regression of fitted match values on experi-
ence at entry to the firm made little difference to the experience coeffi cient. This suggests
there is no heterogeneity amongst firms in terms of their tendency to hire experienced or
inexperienced workers.
4.4 Exploring the Source of the Bias: The Role of Firm Employ-
ment
The analytical arguments above pointed to co-movements in firm wages and employment as
the source of the problem. In this section we see the extent to which current and lagged firm
employment can account for the bias. We do this in two ways. First we control for current
and once-lagged firm employment levels in the Base specification and see what effect it has
in terms of reducing the bias. Secondly we calibrate the bias by plugging estimates from this
augmented Base specification (together with other data moments from the panel) into our
simple analytical model above.
A first pass at removing the bias might be to purge firm wages of the effects of firm
employment by adding the latter as a regressor to the Base specification18. Adding a single
term in (log of)19 firm employment to Base alters the RTTE estimates little;20 the bias is
reduced by no more than 10% in either country at any tenure up to 20 years. Adding lagged
firm employment is equally impotent in this respect. This suggests that if wage/employment
co-movements are the source of bias then such co-movements must be heterogeneous across
firms. We now explore this issue further.
We estimate a model that allows for heterogeneous and dynamic firm wage/employment
18For example, in their analysis of seniority and using the QP, Buhai et al. (2014) add a single term in
firm employment to control for what they call the firm size effect on wages.
19The theoretical analysis is in terms of employment levels normalised by average firm employment, L
f
.
Using logs (and hence estimating elasticities) is an approximation therefore.
20Fuller results available on request.
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co-movements. Explicitly we estimate













γ1j djtljt−1 + δ1t+ δ2t
2 + e0it, (13)
where djt is a dummy equal to 1 when the wage is drawn from firm j and zero otherwise
and where ljt is log of firm j’s employment at t. We call this regression the "Employment"
specification. Estimating (13) has a treble purpose. First we wish to see the extent to which
absorbing wage/employment co-movements reduces bias. Second we wish to establish the ex-
tent of heterogeneity of wage/employment co-movements. Thirdly we wish to obtain "good"
estimates of wage/employment elasticities for a calibration exercise. The key parameters for
the calibration are the γj0 terms. In order to obtain consistent estimates of these we need to
nest as much of the employment/wage co-movements as possible in (13). Limiting the lag
length in (13) to one is driven in part by prior theoretical reasoning and in part by degrees
of freedom constraints. We effectively have only 22 (24) time series observations with which
to estimate each firm’s γ’s so two γ’s per firm would seem a reasonable choice on degrees
of freedom grounds. With regards to prior reasoning, hiring costs and or labour adjustment
costs would suggest that current and lagged employment are the prime correlates of current
wages.
We estimated (13) and recomputed the bias (Employment RTTE minus Base RTTE).
The results are in Figures 5 and 6. We add the "FYFE minus Base" line to Figures 5 and 6
for comparison. Looking at the Figures we see that adding the employment terms produces
RTTE estimates very close to those obtained in the FYFE specification for Germany –
effectively removing the bias. For Portugal the results are less definitive but even so the
extra terms reduce the bias by over 70% at 20 years of tenures.
Turning to heterogeneity, Figures 7 to 10 show the distribution across firms of the es-
timated employment elasticities γ0j and γ
1
j for each country. We see from the Figures that
there is indeed a diverse pattern of wage/employment co-movements across firms.21 Inter-
estingly the average contemporaneous elasticity – an estimate of σ0 – is positive in both
countries (.073 for Portugal and .011 for Germany). This is consistent with downward bias
in estimates of RTTE.
At the risk of taking our simple model too seriously we calibrate the bias using estimates
from (13) and sample moments to see if we can match the bias we saw in the Base specifica-
tion. The general form for the bias is given in equation (6). Adapting it to the case where
21Standard errors of the elasticities (the γ’s) in both the Employment specification (and Employ-
ment/Dynamic specification used below) were low and a test of parameter equality is rejected by a very
large margin.
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= (sσ1 − σ0plim{τ}) /plim{svar(τijt)}. (14)
We plug estimates from (13) into equation (14) together with data sample moments to
calibrate the bias. Explicitly we estimate σ0 with
n∑
j=1




denote an OLS estimate from (13). We use Hobijn and Sahin’s (2007) estimates of annual
separation rates for Portugal and Germany of .11 and .12 respectively giving survival rates,
s, of .89 and .88. Finally we estimate plim{svar(τijt)} with its sample counterpart from
our data. Table 3 shows the estimated bias at 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of tenure predicted by
the calibration (Bias(Cal)). The initial biases (FYFE minus Base) are also tabulated for
comparison (denoted Bias(Base)).
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Table 3: Calibrating The Bias
Portugal
σ0 = .073, σ1 = −.070, svar(τijt) = 104, s = .89
τ 5 10 15 20
Bias(Cal) % of wage −2.54 −5.08 −7.62 −10.16
Bias(Base) % of wage −2.90 −4.42 −5.03 −5.12
Germany
σ0 = .011, σ1 = .028, svar(τijt) = 53.3, s = .88
τ 5 10 15 20
Bias(Cal) % of wage −.98 −1.96 −2.94 −3.92
Bias(Base) % of wage −.74 −1.69 −2.64 −3.54
Table 3 shows that for Germany the calibrated bias fits its empirically estimated coun-
terpart extremely well over all tenures. For Portugal the fit is reasonably good up to 10
years of tenure but above that is poor. There are two features of the simple model that may
be behind this last result. Firstly – despite its quadratic form – the estimated RTTE for
Germany is close to being linear for tenures up to 20 years whilst that for Portugal is dis-
tinctly nonlinear. Our analytical model has of course only one (linear) tenure term. Second
the simple model assumes equal size firms (on average) but Table 3 shows that the standard
deviation of the log of average firm employment is 25% higher in Portugal than in Germany.
One final problem could be that higher order lags are missing for Portugal’s Employment
specification leading to a poor estimate of the crucial γ0j parameters. This last fact may also
be the reason only 70% of the bias is removed by the Employment specification.
Despite the over prediction of the bias at long tenures for Portugal the simple analytical
model appears to have had some traction in explaining the origin, sign and magnitude of
the empirical bias we have discovered in RTTE estimates.
4.5 Tenure Correlates: minu and δ0u
We argued above in section 3.2 that estimates of macro tenure correlates such as minu and
δ0u will be subject to similar biases as tenure itself.
To illustrate biases that may arise we once again use our simple model in (1) to (4) as
the data generating process and estimate by pooled OLS:
wijt = α + βτijt + λ
kukijt +$jt (15)




ijt ) is the value of worker i’s minu (δ
0u) at time t
in firm j. As before we ignore worker idiosyncratic wage shocks to conserve notation.
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We can show using textbook formulae that the bias in λk can be written as
(λ̂kOLS − λk) ∝ ρwuk − ρwτρτuk
where ∝ means "positively proportional to" and ρxy is the correlation coeffi cient between
x and y. We can view these correlation coeffi cients through the lens of our simple model.
If we assume once more that σ0j > 0 but σ
k
j = 0, k > 0, then removing the effects of
aggregate shocks by adding Year FE reduces the bias in absolute value.22 However the
sign of the effect of moving to a specification with FYFE (i.e. controlling for idiosyncratic
firm wage/employment co-movements) is indeterminate: The terms ρwτ and ρτuk are both
negative (the former we have demonstrated already and the latter derives from the fact
that uk is weakly decreasing with tenure) whilst ρwuk is positive which implies we cannot
determine the sign of the impact of idiosyncratic co-movements on the bias. We repeat our
earlier contention that in the context of estimating the effects of variates that move only
over time and tenure, common wage components are at best noise and at worse bias-causing.
These wage components should be removed whatever the sign of the bias. We now assess
the impact on λ of doing so.
In macroeconomic applications involving minu and δ0u it is important to additionally
control for the aggregate business cycle. We do this by adding Year FE to our new Base
specification. Explicitly we add minu and δ0u to (11) and (12). Table 4 displays the results.
Table 4: Bias in minu and δ0u
Germany Portugal
minu δ0u minu δ0u
Year FE −.405 −.551 −.928 −.495
(.046) (.039) (.113) (.040)
FYFE −.419 −.526 −.289 −.441
(.026) (.029) (.029) (.014)
All estimates are highly significant although quantitatively small. For Germany, adding
FYFE changes little in either estimate but in Portugal and for minu things are different; the
FYFE estimate is less (in absolute value) than one-third of its Year FE value. Portugal’s
δ0u value also moves towards zero but far less – by only 10% or so of its original value.
We close by returning to a point made in the initial discussion of macro variates above. We
argued that omission of relevant tenure correlated variates such as these will cause further
bias to RTT. Controlling for tenure related macro effects is a two way street: failing to
control for FYFE may bias their estimates whilst omitting these variates may bias estimates
of RTT. Figures 11 and 12 display the differences in RTTE estimates we get when we add
each respective macro variate to the FYFE specification in (12). Adding δ0u clearly reduces
22Proof of this and the other results in this section is straightforward and is available on request.
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RTT by a non negligible amount – up to 3% (1.5%) of wages for Germany (Portugal).
Adding minu has far less impact – less than a 1% reduction in both countries. Clearly it
is important to control for tenure related macro variates if one wishes to obtain good RTT
estimates.
Finally we should check that adding FYFE to the Year FE specification continues to
make a difference even in the specifications containing minu and δ0u. Figures 13 and 14
show the difference in RTTE we get when we add FYFE to the Year FE specification in
the minu/δ0u specifications (marked as "Minu"/"Deltau" on the graph). For comparison
we add the line showing the impact of adding FYFE (moving from (11) to (12)) when
the macro terms are absent (marked as "No Macro" on the graph). The Figures confirm
emphatically that addition of FYFE remains important despite the addition ofminu and δ0u
to the specifications. In fact the impacts are practically the same as those found originally
in section 4 except for the case of minu in Portugal. Here adding FYFE to the Year FE
increases RTTE by over 6% at long tenures compared with an original impact (absent macro
variates) of just over 4%.23
We summarise by saying that adding tenure related macro effects is important in order
to get good estimates of RTT. Likewise adding FYFE is essential to get good estimates of
both RTT and tenure related macro effects.
5 Summary and Closing Comments
We have shown that failing to control for co-movement of wages and employment at firm level
leads to downward bias in RTT estimates obtained from reduced form wage equations. We
also argued the same mechanism could also bias the coeffi cients on correlates of deterministic
tenure such as minu and δ0u. Our estimates from all the wrokers in 100 or so large long
lived Portuguese and German firms imply that these biases are quantitatively important. In
other words, our findings indicate that the importance of tenure in terms of wages has been
substantially underestimated in the existing literature. Given that this literature informs
issues involving internal labour markets, rent sharing, training and institutional dimensions
in labour market outcomes then obtaining more rigorous measurement of the effects of tenure
using the methods we propose here would seem to be important.
We conclude on a warning. In another exercise we drew a set of small random worker-
based random subsamples from our main dataset and re-estimated equation (12) - i.e. con-
trolling for FYFE - each time. The variation in RTT estimates was very high. There seems
to be an incidental parameter problem here. Small worker-based random samples offer few
observations per firm per year. As a result the FYFE will be poorly estimated. This suggests
that when obtaining reduced form estimates of RTT a (large) firm based samples rather than
23This is of course a mirror image of the large impact that adding FYFE has to the minu estimate in the
case of Portugal.
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worker based ones are required to eliminate the bias.
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Appendix
Bias using Topel’s Method


























Bias using Altonji and Shakotko’s method
Note that workers joining firm j at t all have the same expected tenure. The average of




































































= −σ0τ(s) < 0.
Proof that the variances of FYFE minus Base tenure estimates are less than
those of Base
We start with model (10). We expand the error term e0it into two components ξijt and ωjt
– an idiosyncratic worker shock and a firm-year "shock". Under the null these shocks are
mutually uncorrelated and uncorrelated with the regressors (we consider the match effects
to be regression dummies):







ijt + θij + δ1t+ δ2t
2 + ξijt + ωjt.
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If we put the four tenure terms, the square of age and the worker firm match dummies
into a single regressor matrix X say with the first four columns being the occupied by the
(quartic) tenure terms, we can write the Base regression model in the familiar textbook form:




N(β̂OLS − β) has the standard form:
√





X ′(ξ + ω)√
N
.
Writing ω = Zγ where Z is a regressor matrix containing firm-year dummies24 with coeffi -
cient vector γ we get the augmented regression model
y = Xβ + Zγ + ξ.
Denote the estimate for β from this new regression as β∗. We can obtain the OLS estimate
of β∗ in a roundabout (two-step) way. First regress y on X and Z. Then compute the fitted
values ω∗ = Zγ∗. Run a second regression
y = Xβ + ω∗δ + ξ.
The estimate of δ will be unity whilst the estimate of β will be numerically identical to











In short the textbook X prime X matrix is asymptotically block diagonal. We can therefore
write
√
T (β∗ − β) as
√








Using the fact that under the null both β̂OLS and β∗ are consistent we can write the difference




















24We must drop two FYFE dummies because X includes t and t2. It does not matter for the proof which
of the FYFE dummies we drop.
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. But under the null ω and ξ are














where A is a positive definite matrix. Finally note that the RTT estimate at tenure τ
evaluated at some estimated coeffi cient vector β∗∗ is just
RTT (τ, β∗∗) = (τ, τ 2, τ 3, τ 4, 0, 0, . . . , 0)β∗∗.
It follows that for large N, var{RTT (τ, β̂OLS)} > var{RTT (τ, β∗ − β̂OLS)}. For large N
then we may use the variance of RTT (τ, β̂OLS) (Base) as an upper bound for the variance
of the differences in the RTT estimates (FYFE-Base).
24
Note: The middle lines in Figures 1 to 4 above are the estimates indicated in the respective
title. The two sets of outer bands are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively.
25
26
Note: The grey lines in Figures 5 and 6 above are the Employment-Base RTTE estimates.
The dark lines are FYFE-Base. The vertical gap between the two lines represents the
extent of the bias remaining after controlling for the firm employment terms.
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Note: Figures 7 and 8 (resp. 9 and 10) give absolute frequencies of the γ0j and γ
1
j
elasticities respectively from the Employment specification for Portugal (Germany).
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Note: Figures 11 and 12 show the impact on tenure profiles of adding minu and δu0 to
the specification that includes FYFE, equation (12). Figures 13 and 14 show tenure bias
using Year FE as the base (i.e. FYFE - Year FE) for specifications including Minu and
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